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FOR RELEASE TUESDAY A.M.'S
REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
at the
BEGOLE-BROWNELL LECTURE, OLIVET COLLEGE, OLIVET, MICHIGAN
Monday, March 29, 1971
8:00 p.m. c.s.t.
THE NIXAN DOCTRINE
I have not come here

t~

make a political speech.

Spring is

not the season for politics, unless you are a young man running
for the Presidency.
term.

Or unless you are a President in your first

I am no longer that young.

Senate.

I am in my fourth term in the

I run for office only in Montana and I have only recently

been re-elected.
In any event, the subject of my remarks is not po litical.
The Nixon Doctrine is

n~t

a partisan policy.

by the President as a partisan thrust.
Senate with a political parry.
issued this Declaration on Asian

It was not advanced

It was not met in the

On the contrary, when the Presider-t
p~licy

eighteen months

support was immediately extended to him fr om the Senate.
came from Republicans and it came from Democrats .

ag~,

It
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What differences there are with regard to foreign relations,
derive from policies not from politics and they are shared by
members of both parties.
partisan forum.
grind.

The Senate, today, is not an intensely

As Majority Leader, I have no political axes to

My relationship with a Republican President has been

correct and cordial.

In matters of foreign policy, the relation-

ship does not differ greatly from that which existed with his
predecessor, a Democrat.
Over the years in Washington, I have seen s omething of the
burdens of the Presidency.

They are great and lonely.

affairs, the President is out in front at all times.
is direct and relentless.

In foreign
The pressure

In this connection, when the late

John F. Kennedy assumed personal responsibi lity for the Cuban
debacle, he quoted an old saying,

"victory has a hundred fathers

and defeat is an orphan."
Regardless of party, a President is entitled to understanding in his responsibil ities .

Since I have been in the Senate,

-~J

it has been my practice to extend to the incumbent of the
Presidency whatever I could in the way of support, cooperation
and consolation.

In doing so, however, I have not overlooked

the separate Constitutional obligations of Senators nor the
Leadership's additional responsibilities to the other 99 members
of the Senate.

Three Presidents have known that I do not stand

on partisan ground.

They have also known where I stood on the

issues.
The Nixon Doctrine is one of those issues because it
is a touchstone in our relations with Asia and the rest of the
world.

The Doctrine was set forth with the intent of bringing

about an adjustment in U. S. policy in the Western Pacific.
Eighteen months later, there is concern with the follow-through.
This concern does not arise from a retrogression to
some sort of is olation.

Provided the issues are clearly

presented, the people of the nation are discerni ng enough t o
r ec ognize that the alternative to one distort ion is not a nother.
I reiterate, provided the issues are clearly presented.

- 4There is no escape by national isolation from the
complexities of our times.

We will have to live with these

complexities and work with them, and do so in cooperation with
other nations of the world or in conflict with other nations.
There is no shell of sky large enough to shut out the rest of
the globe.

There is no sweep of ocean.

There is no electronic

shield, no insulating web of missiles.
Isolation is no answer to the nation's needs.

But

neither is internationalism some sort of incantation against
the ills of international life.

We will search in vain to

safeguard our security and well-being by an internationalism
which leads us to project military forces into the farthest
reaches of the globe and to mainta i n them there without the
comprehension of the people of this nation and without the
understanding and cooperation of the rest o f the world's peo ple .
That reality ought not to be overlooked in an exc e ss
of concern in

t.h~

ExeCllti ve Rra.nf'l1 tha t . th e hmcr ican people

- 5 will "retreat to isolation, " at any suggestion of an adjustment
in the present course of foreign policy.

We would do well,

instead, to note carefully the danger of persisting in a course
which has already alienated many people at home and abroad and
has led the nation a long way down the road to an isolated
internationalism.
If I may lay aside, then, this non-issue of isolation
along with partisan politics, as a basis for my remarks, I would
like to turn your attention, now, to the Nixon Doctrine.

The

subject is of particular interest because shortly after the
Doctrine was set forth in the summer of 1969, I went to Southeast
Asia.

I did so at the request of the Pnesident, and in the

course of the journey, sought to convey some understanding of
the President's new approach to Asia.
In a public report in September 1969, I pointed out
that the Nixon Doctrine did not mean the United States was
ing its back on Asia.

Rather, the Doctrine wa s designed t o

tu~n-

- 6 reduce the factor of U. S. military participation in the
problems of that region.

The Doctrine's aim, too, was to fore-

close new situations of dependency as had developed in Viet Nam;
contrary to our interests such situations tended to lead to
involvement in Asian conflicts.
In further interpretation of the Doctrine, I noted
that we intended to alter aid-policies by placing more emphasis
on economic aid and less on military help.

Even with regard to

economic aid, moreover, it was to be expected that we would
shift from a unilateral approach and participate when desirable
in whatever multi-sided cooperation Asian nations were inclined
to develop themselves.
I made clear that the Nixon Doctrine did, indeed,
imply major adjustments in long-standing U. S. policies in the
Western Pacific, policies which had been formulated in the
aftermath of World War II and the Korean War.

Circumstances

had long since changed greatly and we had not kept pace.

As
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a result, we found ourselves more deeply involved in Southeast
Asia than warranted by the nation's interests.
had become both anachronistic and wasteful.

The U. S. role

Most seriously, an

over-long persistence in that role had led us into the tragedy
of Viet Nam.

The time had come to alter it.

It seemed to me that the essence of the Nixon Doctrine
was to be found in the President's frequent references to a new
"low-profile 1' policy.

I agreed fully with that concept and so

stated many times in Asia and at home.

Moreover, the Administra-

tion soon made clear that the new Doctrine would apply, not only
in Asia but throughout the world.

With that extension, too, I

agreed completely.
During 1969 and the early months of 1970, the Executive
Branch elaborated the Nixon Doctrine in specific actions.

The

U. S. military base structure was curtailed in the Far East.
Reductions were made in official personnel throughout the region.
The Executive Branch entered into negotiations with the Japanese

- 8 -

government pursuant to the agreement which the Preident had
achieved with Japan on the Okinawan question.

That settlement

promised to remove a spur of increasing tension in U. S.-Japanese
relations.

Largely by the President's personal efforts, diplo-

matic relations were restored with Prince Sihanouk's Cambodia
and the restoration seemed to check the danger of a spill-over
of Vietnamese hostilities into that nation.

Initiatives were

also taken by the President to enlarge contact with the Chinese
People's Republic.
The most significant implications of the Nixon Doctrine,
of course, involved Viet Nam.

Despite obvious difficulties of

immediate application, U. S. military forces in Viet Nam were
reduced by 100,000 men between July 1969

a~d Ap~ il

1970.

With

the reduction came a sharp drop in casualties and in the cost of
the war.

At the same time, new U. S. leadership was supplied to

the negotiations in Paris.
peace in Viet Nam.

Hopes quickened for a negotiated

- 9 -

Elsewhere in the world, the inertia in U. S. policy
seemed to be ending under the impetus of the Nixon Doctrine.
There were indications of an intentm reduce the cost of maintaining a garrison of half a million military personnel and
dependents i n Western Europe.

The new SALT talks on disarmament.

as they involved ICBM's, ABM's and other laconic euphemisms of
civilization's suicide, opened on an encouraging note.

A

Defense budget, swollen with cost over-runs and oth2r waste as
well as the price of the Vietnamese War,

~egan

to be curbed in

the wake of the Senate's great debate on the Anti-Ballistics
Missile.
The Nixon Doctrine, in short, appeared to have set
off a chain reaction which promised to br i ng up to date t he
nation's international security affairs.
in the Senate and in the nation.

It was most welcome

For a l 0ng time, we had

remained wedded to the needs of another era.
to indulge ourselves with polic i es and

We ha d continued

pr a cti c e ~

born of
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another time.

As a nation, we had been so deeply concerned

for two decades with threats from abroad, that we had overlooked
the erosion of the

nati~n's

inner security and well-being.

The Nixon Doctrine opened the shutters on these musty
thought-processes.

In so doing, there was revealed the possi-

bility of adjustments of policy abroad which would also redound
to the benefit of the situation within the nation.

Billions of

dollars of taxes, not to speak of the creative skills

a~d

energy

of young people, were involved in the excessive and increasingly
isolated search for national security in Viet Nam and elsewhere
abroad.

With the advent of the Nixon Doctrine, it seemed that

some of these Druffiense resources might begin to be channeled
into urgent needs at home.
In my judgment, the President dese :':'ves
for having established this turning point.

g:~ e at

credit

The Nixon Doctrine

was an invitation to change --long overdue clwt:ge-- if 1 tl'ay use
that overworked word, a c hange in prior ities.

- ll -

Then, there was April 30, 1970 and the American
military incursion into Cambodia.

The event is recent.

remember it and there is no point in a re-run.
position clear,

~et

You

To make my

me say only that I opposed the incursion

before it began; I was saddened by its beginning; I regard it,
even now, with regret, although it is held in some quarters to
have been a ''successful operation."
At the time, it seemed to me that the incurs icn
the war deep into what had been, for all practical

pur pc~e s ,

the only non-dependent nation in Indochina in which

t h e~e

~

existed a measure of stability self-achieved under
responsive civilian government.

th r~st

rse.sonably

Most serious, the Ce.ml;od ian

incursion enlarged the battlefield.

In so

do i~g ,

to prolong the U. S. involvement and open u p

~

it promised

new

sc~:ce

of

U. S. casualties.
That position was not arrived <'-t
re-asserted lightly now.

The Cambodia n

l ir.;'.~:!:; ly ..

~r.cm·sion

It ::.. s not

was jus tified

- 12 largely in terms of saving American lives.

That is a considera-

tion that has always weighed heavily with me and every other
member of the Senate.

It was apparent then, however, and it

is apparent now that the termination of our involvement in the
war in Viet Nam and a prompt withdrawal would save far more
~ 1'\...1.-{un..-11.. ~\. fOtv

??l.-~ [•<-'' .t..__.,

American livesAthan an enlargement of the a~ea of conflict.
As it was, in tre brief in vas ion of Cambodia a year
p :.-:~•:: es "

ago 362 Americans died and 2, 205 were wounded--in the
of

11

saving American lives."

And in the process of

American lives, 11 our forces in Indochina have

se. v ~. !1g

incur~~ ;:r.l r

ties of 4,000 dead and 18,000 wounded in the year
Cambodian incursion.

11

In the light of those grim

s in:~

the

fi gi-.::'~c:-::

may well be asked--are we saving lives or saving face ?
question becomes even more pertinent when rmt ::.:1 ·::r.c;
of total casualties:

::.sual-

it

'rhe

~ '"'.:~::; pective

54,000dead; almost 300, C00 WD'.tr:J:< , since

the beginning of this tragic conflict.

- 13 This sacrifice of American life to date is indicativP.
of the magnitude of the war's toll.
benefit it was intended,
greatly in the war.

The people, for whose
have, themselves, suffered

Hundreds of thousands of Indochinese men,

women and children, have been killed and maimed.
created millions of refugees.

The war has

Ancient cultures and the natural

environment in which they flourished have been damaged beyond
calculation by the devastating tools of modern warfare.
If the war was widened by the Cambodian incursion,
it was widened, again, by the Laotian incursion.

With that

development, what was once the Vietnamese conflict became a
full-fledged Indochina war.
ment in

South ~ Viet

What was once an American involve-

Nam was consolidated into an American invol ve-

ment in all of Indochina.

Notwithstanding linguistic gymnastic s,

an extension of warfare into vast new areas of combat cannot b e
depicted as a contraction of the war.

- 14 The fact is that we are still held fast in the evershifting current of a struggle which has gone on almost cont i nuously for a quarter of a century.
the end of the tunnel.

It is a war which does not stop at the

borders of South Viet Nam.
Cambodia.

It is a war without light a t

It does not stop at the borders of

It does not stop at the borders of Laos.

is the end?

Where, t hen >

Indeed, there may be none, unless it is in Peking

or beyond, in a worldwide nuclear inferno.
How we are entrapped or, more accurately perhaps, how
we entrap ourselves in this pattern of expanding violenc e i s
illustrated by events in Cambodia.

I would note that on Apri l

30, 1970, there were scarcely a half-do zen American offic ial s
in Cambodia and they were carrying out the most limited diplomatic functions.

There are now many times that number and t hey

are carrying on a variety of functions.
On April 30, 1970, we had no obligations what soever
to the government of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia; its fa t e wa s

- 15 in its own hands.

Since the overthrow of Sihanouk, we have

already made aid-commitments totaling $260 million to the
successor government.

That government's fate is not in its

own hands; it is now in ours.

It is dependent for survival on

the United States and on the Saigon government which, in turn,
is dependent on the United States.
To be sure, the U. S. ground forces which were sent
into the Cambodian border regions were withdrawn after a campaign
of several weeks.

To be sure, in Laos, U. S. service personnel

have not set foot on the ground in any great numbers.

Presumably,

in deference to the Cooper-Church amendment, they have been
restricted to hovering a few feet above the ground.

However,

U. S. planes and helicopters crisscross Laos and Cambodia many
times a day.

They fly missions of bombing and other direct

combat support, supply, transport, evacuation, reconnaissance
and whatever.

U. S.

in both Cambodia

~nd

plane~

and helicopters are now shot down

Laos as well as in Viet Naffi and meu often

..
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die when they are shot down.

We do not disinvolve ourselves

withdrawing on the ground while we plunge in more deeply through
the air.

Involvement is involvement, whatever it is called.
To be sure, the President deserves every credit for

having reduced overall U. S. troops numbers in Viet Nam by more
than 200,000 since the beginning of his Administration.
there are over 300,000 Americans still in Indochina .

But

Further-

more, the use of U. S. air-power seems much more intensive than
a year ago--that, in a primitive region which has already been
bombed with more than twice the total mnnage dropped in both
World War II and the Korean War.
Costs are costs wherever incurred.

Casualties a re

casualties whether they are received on the ground or in the
air.

While · lower costs are better than hig her and fewer

casualties are obviously to be preferred to more, all losses
are tragic in a mistaken war.
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If it is not in the interest of this nation to be in
the war with ground forces, how can it be with air forces?

To

be sure, it may seem more palatable but it is not more purposeful .
It is not less wasteful.
The prerequisite of a meaningful application of the
Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia seems to me to be the termination of the U. S. military involvement--land, air and sea--in
Indochina and military withdrawal from that region, lock, stock
and barrel.

That termination is not yet visible.

That with-

drawal is not yet in sight.
It is not only with regard to Indochina that there
are grounds for concern over what has happened to the Nixon
Doctrine since April 1970.

Digressions or delays appear to be

developing elsewhere in Asia.

It is many months later, but the

details of the Okinawan settlement have yet to be completed by
the Executive Branch.

Difficulties with Japan have also a risen

over trade questions and a short time ago were even allowed to

'
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reach a tempestuous stage .

As I s ee it, U. S.-Japanese trade is

of immense value to both countries even as a political relationship of mutual consideration and forebearance between the two
countries is essential to the elaboration of the Nixon .Doctrine
in the Western Pacific .

It is disturbing, therefore, to find

what appearsto be the intrusion of petty bickering and personal
pique into these vital ties .
Also of great importance to the Nixon Doctrine is the
restoration of civility with the Chinese People's Republic .

The

President has shown a consistent initiative in this connection.
Whether a satisfactory relationship can be achieved at this
time is another matter .

Certainly, it is not a very promising

prospect when the Indochinese war has again been extended to
within minute s bombing range of the Chinese borcers and, in the
circumstances, the Chinese have re - affirmed publicly their completf
support of the North Vietnamese .

Moreover, U. S . policy has yet

to come to grips with the vehement rejection of a ''two-China ''

•

- 19 concept by both the government of the Republic of China and
the Chinese People's Republic.

Both insist that Taiwan and

mainland China are parts of one Chinese nation.
Elsewhere in the world, in Western Europe in particular,
there seems also to have been a retrogression from the Nixon
Doctrine.

While the need for a cut in the consignment of U. S.

forces to Europe is more and more recognized in the Senate, the
reluctance of the Executive Branch to act remains as great under
this Administration as it was under its predecessor.

It is

reluctance, apparently, stimulated by the anxieties of the
German and other European governments who remain unwilling,
nevertheless, to relieve this nation of any substantial part
of the present one-sided burden of the costs of NATO defense.
To maintain U. S. forcgs in Europe is estimated to
account for $14 billion of the annual Defense Department budget.
This expenditure is made, presumably, to forestall or to meet a
possible military thrust from the Soviet Union.

It is an
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expenditure which has gone on year in and year out for almost
two decades.

In the meantime, by contrast, in the policies of

both the Western European countries and the Soviet Union, the
fear of such a conflict has been progressively downgraded and,
today, the accent in both parts of Europe is almost entirely on
the contacts of peace.
Let me make clear that the sentiment in the Senate for
a change in U. S. policies regarding NATO has nothing to do with
severing treaty relationships with Western Europe or with the
complete withdrawal of the U. S. military garrison from Europe .
The NATO treaty remains highly regarded and a U. S. mi li ta ry
presence in Europe, as an earnest o f the importance which thw
nation still attaches to the alliance, is a principle that has
long been accepted.

That is not the quec·sion.

in the Senate, rather, is a substantial

What is sought

reduct ~on

i~

the half-

million of U. S. forces with dependent8 that are maintained in
Europe

~t

such great cost to the peo ple of this nation.

The
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resistance of the Executive Branch to this change in my judgment
is ill-founded and may well produce, in time, a Congressional
reaction which will compel drastic reductions.
To bring these remarks to a close, I want to note again.
as I did at the outset, my deep belief in the urgency of the
adjustments of U. S. policy which are implicit 1n the Nixon
Doctrine.

I would be less than ca ndid, however, if I did not

express the concern which I have with the
sions, dodges and delays which have bee11

digres-

dive~gencies,

e n co~ntere~

in carrying

out the Doctrine.
We have not escaped the consequences of this
tination at home.

p~ocras-

In my judgment the absence of a vigorous

follow-through on the Doctrine has had much to do with the
persistence of the inflation and the slack in the economy.
has had much to do with our

contir:ui~g

inability to confront

fully the financial and other problems of the States and
localities .

It has had much to do

w i ~. h

tl1e i:1c..de::quate v.ay

It
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in which we are meeting the whole range of c om pelling needs of
our national life whether they be pollution,

welfa~e,

u~employ-

ment, violence or whatever .
There is blame enough to spare for things done and
done.

~ot

Where the finger points often depends on who is pointing

and I shall not point mine.

The fundamental difficulty, as I

see it, is that the President and the Congress function in a
government grown immense.

It is a government whose gears raust

grind in a complex synchronization if they are to grind at all.
The machinery is not easily moved by the President alone and
certainly not, alone, by the Congress.

Yet it must be moved

i~

there is to be a fulfillment of the promise of the Nixon Doctrine
and a realistic adjustment of our policies in line l>i ith its
implications.

In my judgment, the primary need, the critical

need,is an end to the involvement in Indochina:
In their separate Constitutional

auth~rity

as

an enc, period.

necezs~ry

3~~

cooperation, where possible, the effort must be made by

~he

President and the Congress to meet that need.
The Republic d 2serves nc le2s,

j~

